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One country’s fiscal nudge is another country’s fiscal dud. In an important piece
research, Ethan Ilzetzki and colleagues from the University of Maryland shine a light on
the key interaction between monetary policy and fiscal stimulus.
When the 2008 financial crisis hit the world, the world hit back. Policymakers around the
globe responded rapidly and aggressively to the most significant financial crisis the world
had experienced in close to a century. Central banks slashed interest rates, which fell to
close to zero in industrialised countries. They unleashed a barrage of unconventional
monetary policies – “quantitative easing” in the United Kingdom, “credit easing” in the US,
“swap” transactions between the United States Federal Reserve and the European
Central Bank. In the rush to fix things, there was a tendency to look for big, broad
solutions, for one-size-fits-all strategies that would give the impression that our leaders, on whose watch the
chaos had struck, were at least now in charge of events.
Of course, it was never going to be easy, if only because a crisis born of almost unimaginable complexity was
never going to submit to broad-brush countermeasures. In the wake of the first wave of the crisis (for the
crisis is still very much with us), Enrique Mendoza and Carlos Vegh of the University of Maryland and I have
examined the varying effects of fiscal stimulus programmes using data from 44 countries.
The idea behind fiscal stimulus is to boost demand and nudge economies out of recession. One of the first
acts of the newly elected Obama administration in February 2009 was to pass a $787 billion stimulus
package through the US Congress. Most recently, in December, President Obama passed, with bi-partisan
support, a bill prolonging both the previous Bush administration’s tax cuts and his own administration’s
extension of unemployment benefits. Obama justified these measures as an additional attempt to stimulate
economic activity. In the developing world, governments made similar attempts; the Chilean government, for
example, increased its expenditure by close to 3 per cent of GDP.
Prior to the 2010 election, the UK pursued similar policies, but more recently, the Coalition Government has
put more of an emphasis on fiscal austerity, with some ministries facing budget cuts in excess of 25 per cent
over the next several years. Austerity has also been the response favoured by eurozone governments. Most
recently, the Irish government, facing a loss in market confidence for its sovereign debt, took measures to
increase public savings by more than 3 per cent of GDP.
Policy advice by economists on the relative merits of economic stimulus and austerity has been divided. In a
January 2009 piece in the Wall Street Journal, the Harvard economist Robert Barro argued that the
peacetime “fiscal multiplier” – the dollar increase in GDP caused by a one dollar increase in government
spending – is essentially zero. At the other extreme, Christina Romer, when she was chair of President
Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, used multipliers as high as 1.6 in estimating the job gains generated
by the 2009 fiscal stimulus package. In the UK, in duelling letters to The Times and the Financial Times,
professors from LSE and other universities were similarly divided on whether immediate action was required
to reduce fiscal deficits or whether fiscal consolidation would deepen the UK’s recession.
Why so much disagreement? One reason is that the evidence of the effects of fiscal policy on economic
activity is limited and often conflicting. One of the biggest hurdles to obtaining precise and consistent
estimates of fiscal multipliers has been the limited availability of data. Most studies in this area have relied on
evidence from a small number of countries, typically the US. What evidence does exist from other sources
shows a very wide range of effects across time and countries. As a result, we sought better, broader and
deeper data. Rather than adding yet another estimate of the effects of fiscal stimulus to an already
confusing list of conflicting evidence we used international data to ask where and when fiscal stimulus is
likely to be effective.
Until recently, most countries reported fiscal data on a quarterly basis, but they didn’t collect data quarterly;
instead, they used statistical methods to estimate quarterly patterns. Fortunately, improvements in data
collection encouraged by the International Monetary Fund and Eurostat have now made such data available.
We worked with the statistical agencies and finance ministries of a number of developing and high-income
countries in order to ensure that the data used in their sample of 44 countries was reliably collected on a
quarterly basis.
What we found was that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends crucially on key country
characteristics, such as the level of development, the exchange-rate regime, the country’s openness to
trade, and public indebtedness. Specifically:
the output effect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing
countries;
the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under fixed exchange rates but zero in
economies operating under flexible exchange rates;
fiscal multipliers in open economies are lower than in closed economies; and
fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are zero.
A key finding has to do with the role of a country’s exchange rate regime in determining the fiscal multiplier
effect of stimulus programmes. The long-run fiscal multiplier is large (approximately 1.5) in countries with
fixed exchange rates; in contrast, in countries with flexible exchange arrangements, the long-run multiplier is
essentially zero. A similar result was found when we compared countries where trade comprises only a small
part of overall economic activity (long-run fiscal multiplier: 1.4) and those highly exposed to international
trade (long-run fiscal multiplier: approximately zero).
These findings may help to explain the significant differences in the effects of fiscal policy across countries
and time periods that had been found in earlier studies. For example, in a 2004 study, the Italian economist
Roberto Perotti estimated that the government expenditure multiplier in the UK declined from 0.1 in 1960-79
to minus 1.2 in 1980-2001. The significant decline in the expansionary power of government purchases in
the UK may be explained by the fact that the pound was pegged to the US dollar until the early 1970s, but
allowed to float freely thereafter. Moreover, international trade has played an increasing role in the UK’s
economic activity, with the ratio of trade to GDP almost doubling since 1960.
We also found a link between monetary policy and fiscal stimulus. Central banks committed to maintaining a
stable exchange rate tend to lower interest rates (by an average of 125 basis points) in response to every 1
per cent of GDP rise in government consumption during the two years following a fiscal stimulus. Conversely,
central banks with other aims (such as an inflation target) increase interest rates (by an average of 60 basis
points); they do so presumably to counteract the inflationary pressures caused by the fiscal expansion, but
with the side effect of potentially negating the effects of stimulus altogether.
These findings have important implications for policymakers. The interaction between fiscal and monetary
policy is a crucial determinant of the effects of fiscal stimulus. For example, it is vital to consider the reaction
of the Bank of England in assessing the potential economic fallout from the UK government’s current
austerity measures. If the Bank of England is capable and willing to respond to the Treasury’s actions by
maintaining low interest rates and continuing unconventional expansionary monetary policies, our estimates
imply that they may be able to significantly mitigate the costs of fiscal austerity. Ireland, because it is part of
the eurozone and cannot pursue an independent monetary policy, is in a much tougher bind. The cost of
austerity measures pursued there could lower GDP by as much as 4 per cent in the upcoming five years.
This article first appeared in the Spring 2011 issue of LSE Research magazine, with additional reporting by
Stryker McGuire.
